Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Matter and Memory', 'Truth and Meaning' and 'The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

11 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
19044 Saying truths fit experience adds nothing to truth; nothing makes sentences true [Davidson]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
7332 There is a huge range of sentences of which we do not know the logical form [Davidson]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / c. Becoming
21846 Bergson was a rallying point, because he emphasised becomings and multiplicities [Bergson, by Deleuze]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
6400 Without the dualism of scheme and content, not much is left of empiricism [Davidson]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
21854 Bergson showed that memory is not after the event, but coexists with it [Bergson, by Deleuze]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
6398 Different points of view make sense, but they must be plotted on a common background [Davidson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
7772 Compositionality explains how long sentences work, and truth conditions are the main compositional feature [Davidson, by Lycan]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
7327 Davidson thinks Frege lacks an account of how words create sentence-meaning [Davidson, by Miller,A]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
7769 You can state truth-conditions for "I am sick now" by relativising it to a speaker at a time [Davidson, by Lycan]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
6179 Should we assume translation to define truth, or the other way around? [Blackburn on Davidson]
6399 Criteria of translation give us the identity of conceptual schemes [Davidson]